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364 
TC HEARTLAND, A LEGALLY WRONG 




Many commentators applauded the TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods 
Group Brands LLC and In re Cray cases for successfully driving patent 
owners away from the Eastern District of Texas.1 However, this Article 
criticizes these two cases for being contrary to both the text and the 
legislative history of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) and cautions that, for the sake 
of prudence, the Supreme Court should not change the venue requirement as 
drastically as TC Heartland. 
This Article further argues that the differences in district courts’ local 
patent rules, instead of the liberalized venue requirement as suggested by 
many scholars, 2  is the real culprit responsible for the forum shopping 
phenomenon at the Eastern District of Texas. A more restrictive venue 
requirement cannot fix the forum shopping problem so long as district courts 
can still adopt their own special procedures for patent cases. This Article 
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 1. Alyssa Miller, Attorneys React to Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017, 
8:52 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-
venue-ruling. 
 2. Alex Chan, Patentee Forum Shopping May Be About To Change, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2016, 9:38 
PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/746615/patentee-forum-shopping-may-be-about-to-change; 
Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Urged To Close ‘Absurd’ East Texas Patent Docket, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2015, 
8:05 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/721246/fed-circ-urged-to-close-absurd-east-texas-
patent-docket; Jimmy Hoover, Fed. Circ. Judge Wary Of Reshaping Patent Suit Venue Rules, LAW360 
(Mar. 11, 2016, 7:53 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/747316/fed-circ-judge-wary-of-
reshaping-patent-suit-venue-rules. 
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proposes to enact Federal Rules of Patent Procedure to uproot the real cause 
of forum shopping. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes 
the development of the general venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and the 
patent venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the already failed venue reform 
bills, the Supreme Court’s opinion in TC Heartland, and the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion in Cray. Part II argues the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretations of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) are contrary to both the 
text and the legislative history of the statute. Parts III and IV argue that the 
Court should be cautious in taking steps as drastic as TC Heartland when 
more lenient venue bills failed at Congress and when Congress has 
continuously liberalized general venue requirements in the past seventy 
years. Part V argues that a more restrictive venue requirement cannot fix the 
forum shopping problem and enacting Federal Rules of Patent Procedure is 
a more direct measure. 
I. THE HISTORY OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(C) & 1400(B) 
A. Enactment, Revisions, and Judicial Interpretations 
In 1789, Congress enacted the first general venue statute, the 
predecessor of § 1391(c), under which venue was proper in any judicial 
district where defendants inhabited or where defendants “shall be found.”3 
In 1887, Congress narrowed this general venue statute by deleting the “shall 
be found” option, leaving only the “inhabit” option for plaintiffs.4 At that 
time, where corporate defendants“ “inhabit” meant “the states in which they 
were “incorporated.”5 
In 1897, Congress passed the first patent venue statute, the predecessor 
of § 1400(b).6 Under this statute, patent owners could bring claims in any 
judicial districts where (1) defendants inhabit or (2) where defendants 
committed infringement and had their “regular and established place of 
business.”7 Because of the “regular and established place of business” prong, 
this patent statute provided more options to patent plaintiffs than the 1887 
general statute provided to general plaintiffs. At the same time, because 
 
 3. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) 
(2011)). 
 4. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)). 
 5. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2017). 
 6. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, 695–96 (1897) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
(2019)). 
 7. Id. at 695. 
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defendants can “be found” in any district where they have a “regular and 
established place of business,” this patent statute was narrower than the 1789 
general statute. At the time, a corporation was still understood to “inhabit” 
only the state in which it was incorporated.8 
In 1948, Congress re-codified the general venue statute into 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c) and the § 1400(b)’s predecessor into 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).9 It 
replaced the term “inhabit” with the term “reside” in both of the two venue 
statutes.10 At the same time, § 1391(c) defined the term “residence” as “any 
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is 
doing business.”11 For the first time, the question arose as to whether the 
definition of “residence” in § 1391(c) supplemented the meaning of “reside” 
in § 1400(b), which did not define the term by itself. In Fourco Glass Co. v. 
Transmirra Products Corp., the Supreme Court held that it did not.12 As a 
result, the term “reside” in § 1400(b) still means “where the corporation is 
incorporated,” as the term “inhabit” used to mean before the simultaneous 
recodification.13  Since then, Congress has not revised the language of § 
1400(b) again. 
Unlike § 1400(b), § 1391(c) has been amended several times after 1948. 
One major relevant change happened in 1988.14 After being amended, § 
1391(c) provided that “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a 
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial 
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 
commenced.”15 Because of the language “for purposes of venue under this 
chapter,” the Federal Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas 
Appliance Co. that Congress finally intended the definition of “reside” in § 
1391(c) to control the meaning of “reside” in § 1400(b).16 After all, § 1391(c) 
 
 8. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1892). 
 9. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)). 
 10. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)), and Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)), with Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)), and Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)). 
 11. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)). 
 12. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957). 
 13. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4642, 
4669 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)) (emphasis added). 
 16. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21. 
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and § 1400(b) were under the same chapter.17 In terms of effect, patent 
plaintiffs finally got the same extent of freedom in choosing where to file 
their claims as other civil plaintiffs did: wherever the courts have personal 
jurisdiction over defendants.18 After VE Holding, the last legislative change 
made to § 1391(c) happened in 2011.19 Congress added the language that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” (called “saving clause” by the 
Supreme Court) “this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions 
brought in district courts of the United States,” and deleted the phrase “under 
this chapter.”20 
Currently, § 1391(c) reads as: 
 
For all venue purposes . . . an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued 
in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, 
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which 
such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to the civil action in question . . .21 
 
and § 1400(b) reads as: “Any civil action for patent infringement may be 
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides (‘first prong’), or 
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular 
and established place of business (‘second prong’).”22 
B. Venue Reform Bills Failed at Congress 
Many scholars blame VE Holding for liberalizing the venue 
requirement for patent owners, thereby enabling them to forum shop.23 They 
argue that the freedom of choice for patent owners resulted in an uncommon 
concentration of filing in a single district court—the Eastern District of 
Texas.24 From January to June 2016, 36.4 percent of patent infringement 
cases were filed at the Eastern District of Texas, almost three times more 
than the number of cases filed in the second most popular venue, the District 
of Delaware.25 
 
 17. Id. at 1578.  
 18. See id. at 1583. 
 19. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011).  
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999). 
 23. See, e.g., Robert M. Parker, The Eastern District Phenomenon, 45 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 27, 28 
(2008). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Owen Byrd, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update/. 
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At the same time, frequent defendants like Samsung, Apple, and other 
high-tech companies kept lobbying Congress for a more restrictive patent 
venue statute.26 Numerous bills about venue reform were introduced to both 
the House and the Senate to restrict patent venue. Each failed. On June 8, 
2005, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas introduced the Patent Reform 
Act of 2005 (“House Bill 2795”). This original Bill did not contain any venue 
provision,27 but an amendment to the bill would have limited patent venue to 
(1) districts in which the defendant had its principal place of business, (2) 
districts in which acts of infringement occurred, and the defendant had an 
regular and established place of business, or (3) districts in which personal 
jurisdiction is proper if the patent owner is a not-for-profit educational 
institution.28 On August 3, 2006, Senator Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy 
further introduced Senate Bill 3818, or Patent Reform Act of 2006, which 
corresponds to the House Bill, and it would have limited patent venue to (1) 
districts in which the plaintiff or defendant has principal place of business or 
is incorporated, or (2) districts in which acts of infringement occurred, and 
the defendant had an regular and established place of business.29 “The intent 
of the venue language is to serve as a starting point for discussions as to what 
restrictions— . . . if any— . . . are appropriate on the venue in which patent 
cases may be brought,” stated Senator Hatch (for himself and Senator 
Leahy).30 Ultimately, Congress did not pass these proposed reform bills, 
since some Senators believed the added amendment about venue was too 
restrictive. 
In the meantime, on April 5, 2006, Representative Howard Berman 
introduced House Bill 5096, or the Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006, 
which adds to the current patent venue statute a “transfer” provision.31 Under 
the “transfer” provision of that bill, if an infringement case is not filed in (1) 
districts in which patentee resides or maintains its principal place of business 
or (2) districts in which accused infringer has principal place of business or 
 
 26. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 11–12 (2017) 
(statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University). 
 27. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (as introduced in the House, June 8, 2005). 
 28. Lamar Smith, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 § 9, at 56–57, 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/AmendedSmithBill.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2019), see also 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, The “Patent Act of 2005”: Hearing on H.R. 2795 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 1–3 (2005) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Prop.). 
 29. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Aug. 3, 
2006). 
 30. 152 CONG. REC. 16,998 (2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 31. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 7 (2006). 
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is incorporated, and if neither plaintiff nor defendant has substantial evidence 
and witness in the original judicial district, the defendant can transfer the 
case to another judicial district where substantial witness and evidence 
exist.32 This bill also failed. 
On April 18, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Howard 
Berman of California introduced Patent Reform Act of 2007, which included 
a patent venue provision nearly identical to the Senate Bill 3818.33 Under 
this Bill, as introduced in the Senate and the House, patent venue would have 
been proper in (1) judicial district where the defendant has principal place of 
business or is incorporated, and (2) judicial district where the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 
business.34  
On July 12, 2007, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania proposed an 
amendment to this bill which further requires that defendant has committed 
“substantial” infringement and “regular and established” physical facility 
which constitute “substantial” operation for defendant in the judicial district 
under the second prong.35 This amendment resulted in severe rebound from 
legislators sided with patent owners. When the Bill finally got reported to 
the Senate and the House, the bill ended up with more provisions favoring 
patent owners. For example, under the final Senate Bill as reported in the 
Senate, patent venue was proper only at the judicial districts where (1) the 
defendant, or for foreign defendant, the primary U.S. subsidiary has its 
principal place of business or is incorporated; (2) the defendant has 
“committed substantial acts of infringement” and has a “regular and 
established” physical facility that constitutes a “substantial” portion of 
defendant’s operations; (3) the plaintiff resides if the plaintiff is an institute 
of higher learning or a non-profit organization serving as patent licensing 
for such institute, or (4) the plaintiff resides if the plaintiff is an individual 
inventor who is a natural person.36 This amendment provided one of the 
most convenient venues for universities and individual inventors, usually on 
the plaintiff’s side. Nevertheless, this amendment also failed. Representative 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 18, 
2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the House, Apr. 18, 
2007).  
 34. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 18, 
2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the House, Apr. 18, 
2007). 
 35. See Michael C. Smith, “A Battle Over Where the War Is to Be Fought”: Venue in Patent Cases, 
The Advocate 10, 11 (2007). 
 36. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24, 
2008). 
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Zoe Lofgren of California, Representative Chris Cannon of Utah, and other 
legislators forcefully criticized the local procedural rules of the Eastern 
District of Texas and argued how this more restrictive venue reform bill 
could solve patent troll problem. However, opponents including Senator 
John Cornyn of Texas and Representative Louie Gohmert of Texas defeated 
this bill, pointing out that the Eastern District of Texas already gained 
valuable experience and expertise in patent litigation.37 
On March 3, 2009, Senator Leahy introduced the Patent Reform Act of 
2009 (“Senate Bill 515”) in the Senate.38 This bill is similar to the Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 as reported in Senate and also contains a “transfer” 
provision similar to the one in Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006.39 
Different from the provision in Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006, 
however, this “transfer” provision allows transfer even when cases are 
originally filed in proper district court.40 This bill also did not survive. 
Before the enactment of the American Invents Act (“AIA”), Congress 
deleted the provision of the bill pertaining to venue. That provision, if 
adopted, would have required a court to transfer a case upon a showing that 
the transferee district is clearly more convenient.41 Because Senators feared 
that this controversial provision would endanger the agreement they had 
reached, it did not appear in the final AIA.42 
The last legislative effort prior to TC Heartland and Cray was the 
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016 (“VENUE Act 
of 2016”). This amendment of § 1400(b) would have allowed a patent 
infringement case to be brought in only judicial districts where:  
 
(1) the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated; (2) 
the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit and 
has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of 
infringement; (3) the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued; (4) an 
inventor named on the patent conducted research or development that led 
to the application for the patent in suit; or (5) a party has a regular and 
established physical facility and has managed significant research and 
development for the invention claimed in the patent, has manufactured a 
tangible product alleged to embody that invention, or has implemented a 
 
 37. See 153 CONG. REC. 23, 935–36 (2007) (statement of Rep. Gohmert); Cornyn Pledges to Fight 
for Fairness for Eastern District of Texas Courts, JOHN CORNYN U.S. SEN. FOR TEX. (July 13, 2007), 
https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/content/cornyn-pledges-fight-fairness-eastern-district-texas-courts. 
 38. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 19 (2009) (describing provisions of the Leahy-Specter-Feinstein 
amendment). 
 42. See 157 CONG. REC. 2,997 (2011). 
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manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the process is alleged 
to embody the invention. 43 
 
Some commentators believed this VENUE Act was more narrowly 
tailored to the Eastern District of Texas problem because it only limited 
patent owners’ venue options slightly.44 At the same time, law professors 
criticized this Act for only relocating patent cases from plaintiff-friendly 
forum to defendant-friendly forums.45 Regardless, this bill failed too. 
C. TC Heartland and Cray 
Finally, in TC Heartland, the Supreme Court gave the defendant 
lobbyists what they wanted.46 On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued 
its landmark opinion in TC Heartland. This opinion reaffirmed its previous 
interpretation of the meaning of “reside” in § 1400(b) and rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation in VE Holding, which had been left intact for 
almost thirty years.47 This reaffirmed interpretation limited proper venue 
under the first prong of § 1400(b) from wherever personal jurisdiction can 
be met back to judicial districts where the corporate defendants are 
incorporated.48 
The Supreme Court held that those amendments made to § 1391(c) 
during the intervening 70 years meant nothing for § 1400(b).49 In patent 
cases, venue is still only proper at the judicial district where the defendant is 
incorporated, how it was in 1948.50 Justice Thomas justified this holding 
under the canon that “when Congress intends to effect a change of that kind 
[overturn a Supreme Court interpretation], it ordinarily provides a relatively 
 
 43. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016). 
 44. Andrew Williams, The VENUE Act—A Last-Ditch Attempt at Patent Reform?, PATENT DOCS 
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/03/the-venue-act-a-last-ditch-attempt-at-patent-
reform.html. 
 45. See Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging Caution on the VENUE 
Act (Aug. 1, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816062 (“The reality is that the major proponents of 
changing the venue rules are primarily large high-tech companies and retailers with an online presence 
sued in the Eastern District of Texas that would rather litigate in a small number of more defendant-
friendly jurisdictions.”). 
 46. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 811 (2017) 
(statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University) (“TC 
Heartland is merely one tactical engagement in wide-ranging lobbying.”). 
 47. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). 
 48. Compare id. with VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 49. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520. 
 50. Id. 
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clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provision.”51 He also 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in the lower proceeding that the 
current phrase “for all venue purposes” was intended to cover more than the 
old phrase “for venue purpose” in 1988. 52  Finally, he strengthened his 
argument by pointing to the “saving clause” added in the 2011 revision: 
“except as otherwise provided by law” and to Congress’ deletion of the 
language “under this chapter.”53 According to Justice Thomas, this indicated 
that Congress did not want to overturn Fourco.54 
Three months later, the Federal Circuit issued a mandamus order in In 
re Cray, which provided guidelines for lower courts to implement the 
“regular and established place of business” prong of § 1400(b) (“the second 
prong”).55 The second prong, as an alternative to the first prong addressed in 
TC Heartland, provides that, in patent infringement cases, venue is also 
proper in the judicial district where the defendant infringed and has “regular 
and established place of business.”56 The Federal Circuit disassembled the 
phrase “regular and established place of business” into three requirements: 
(1) a physical place is necessary, in terms of “a building or part of building” 
or “geographical location” in the district; (2) it must be a regular and 
established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.57 
Cray fulfilled the then urgent need of guidance: during the intervening thirty 
years, there was no case discussing the second prong because the first prong 
could be met whenever personal jurisdiction was proper under the 
overturned VE Holding.58 
In Cray, because both parties agreed that the defendant did not “reside” 
in the judicial district, the Federal Circuit confined its inquiry to whether two 
employees of the defendant and their homes located in a judicial district 
could constitute a “regular and established place of business” under the 
second prong.59 The Federal Circuit first referred to the legislative history of 
the § 1400(b)’s predecessor and explained that the statute served the purpose 
of resolving a district court split about whether the 1887 venue statute 
applied to patent infringement cases or the 1789 statute applied.60  After 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1520–21. 
 53. Id. at 1521. 
 54. Id.  
 55. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999). 
 57. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360. 
 58. Id. at 1359. 
 59. Id. at 1360, 1364. 
 60. Id. at 1360–61. 
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citing a Supreme Court case Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the statute was intended to be a “restrictive 
measure, limiting a prior broader venue (i.e., the 1887 statute),” and “[t]he 
requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those 
vague principles which, in the interests of some overriding policy, is to be 
given a liberal construction.”61 “Be[ing] mindful of this history in applying 
the statute,” Judge Lourie rejected Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor balancing test 
and deconstructed the statute into three requirements: (1) a physical place is 
necessary, in terms of “a building or part of building” or “geographical 
location” in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of 
business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.62 
In reaching this statutory construction, Judge Lourie heavily relied on 
The Century Dictionary.63 For example, although he “recognized that the 
world has changed since 1985 . . . . In this new era, not all corporations 
operate under a brick-and-mortar model,” he still insisted that the term 
“place” independently requires “a physical place.”64 “[W]e must focus on the 
full and unchanged language of the statute,” he said.65 Similarly, the term 
“regular and established” requires a “settled and permanent” place of a 
“steady and methodical” business.66 Finally, the meaning of “of defendant” 
is self-evident: the defendant needs to have control over the place.67 
D. The Effect of TC Heartland and Cray 
In terms of driving plaintiffs away from the Eastern District of Texas, 
TC Heartland and Cray have succeeded. Within the three-months before TC 
Heartland, thirty-three percent of new patent infringement cases were filed 
at the Eastern District of Texas, almost three times more than the number of 
cases filed in the second most popular venue, the District of Delaware.68 In 
the three months following TC Heartland, the percentage dropped to 
thirteen.69 At the same time, the percentage of cases filed in the District of 
Delaware went up to twenty-six percent from thirteen percent.70 
 
 61. Id. at 1361. 
 62. Id. at 1360–61. 
 63. Id. at 1362. 
 64. Id. at 1359, 1362. 
 65. Id. at 1359. 
 66. Id. at 1362–63. 
 67. Id. at 1363. 
 68. Owen Byrd, Patent Litigation Trends in the Three Months after T.C. Heartland, LEX MACHINA 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/patent-litigation-trends-in-the-three-months-after-t-c-heartland/. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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Cray further limited judges’ discretion in finding proper venue under 
the “regular and established place of business” prong by injecting the 
“physical place” requirement into the inquiry. According to Docket 
Navigator, between May 22, 2017 (TC Heartland) and September 21, 2017 
(Cray), Judge Gilstrap denied all of two motions to transfer out from the 
Eastern District of Texas or motions to dismiss for improper venue under the 
“regular and established place” prong.71 In that period, the average denial 
rate for such motions nationwide (excluding the Eastern District of Texas) 
was two out of twenty-one (counting only court orders with final rulings on 
such motions and magistrate judges’ recommendations on such motions).72 
Since September 21, 2017, and up to March 29, 2017, Judge Gilstrap denied 
three of six such motions.73 In the same period, the average denial rate for 
 
 71. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 799 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (order denying 
defendant’s motion to transfer for improper venue); Kranos IP Corp. v. Riddell, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-443-
JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138108, *7–17 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017) (order denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue). 
 72. On the Docket Navigator platform, I searched for court orders under the legal issue “Regular 
and Established Place of Business” entered by all U.S. District Courts, excluding the Eastern District of 
Texas, between May 22, 2017 and September 21, 2017. I received the result of nineteen orders granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, sua sponte dismissal; two orders denying 
such motion with prejudice; three orders denying such motion without prejudice or deferring ruling on 
such motion for further briefing, further discovery, or possible amended complaint; four orders granting 
the plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery or requesting additional briefing before ruling on 
defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; and one order denying the plaintiff’s motion 
for expedited discovery before ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. 
See compass.docketnavigator.com. 
 73. Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-cv-00980-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
193581, *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); 
SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00442-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, *1 
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such motions nationwide (excluding the Eastern District of Texas) was seven 
out of seventy-two (also counting only court orders with final rulings on such 
motions and magistrate judges’ recommendations on such motions).74 This 
data indicates that TC Heartland successfully drove cases from the Eastern 
District of Texas to the District of Delaware and suggests that Cray, to some 
extent, effectively limited district court judges’ discretion in the venue 
determination under the second prong. 
Before the completion of this Article, the Federal Circuit denied a 
petition for mandamus from the defendant in the Eastern District of Texas in 
In re Google LLC.75 In Google, the district court judge held that an Internet 
server of the defendant could constitute a “physical presence” as required by 
the Cray test, as opposed to a few other district court rulings.76 The Federal 
Circuit panel denied the mandamus order because “a post-judgment appeal 
generally is an adequate remedy” for venue concerns. 77  Predictably, the 
result of this case on appeal will significantly affect the lasting outcome of 
Cray and TC Heartland. 
 
(E.D. Tex. July 19, 2018) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); Blitzsafe 
Tex., LLC v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, No. 2:17-cv-00418-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173065, 
*1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); Uniloc 
USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00174-JRG, slip. op. (E.D. Tex. Dec. 06, 2017) (order granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); AGIS Software Dev. LLC v. ZTE Corp. et al., No. 
2-17-cv-00517, *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018) (order granting defendant’s dismiss for improper venue); 
Fractus, SA v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00561-JRG, slip. op. (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018) (order granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue). 
 74. On the Docket Navigator platform, I searched for court orders under the legal issue “Regular 
and Established Place of Business” entered by all U.S. District Courts, excluding the Eastern District of 
Texas, between September 21, 2017 and March 29, 2019. I received the result of sixty-five orders granting 
or recommending granting defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, or sua sponte 
dismissal; seven orders denying or recommending denying such motion with prejudice; seven orders 
denying such motion without prejudice or deferring ruling on such motion for further briefing, further 
discovery or possible amended complaint; one order granting the defendant’s motion to transfer for 
convenience and finding the transferee venue is proper; two orders denying the defendant’s motion to 
transfer for convenience and finding the transferee venue improper; six orders granting the plaintiff’s 
motion for expedited discovery or sua sponte requesting additional briefing before ruling on defendant’s 
motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; zero orders denying the plaintiff’s motion for expedited 
discovery before ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; one order 
denying plaintiff’s motion to retransfer for improper venue; one order granting plaintiff’s motion to add 
new defendants because based on the amended complaint those newly-added defendants had a place of 
business in the judicial district; and one order granting the defendant’s motion to amend its answer to 
include a venue challenge. See compass.docketnavigator.com. 
 75. In re Google Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00442-JRG, 2018 WL 5536478, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2018). 
 76. Id. at *1. 
 77. Id. at *2. 
TC HEARTLAND (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2019  8:25 PM 
376 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 18:3 
II. THE COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF 
THE STATUTES 
TC Heartland and Cray temporarily relieve the forum shopping 
problem, but their reasoning is contrary to both the text and the legislative 
history of the two statutes. As explained below, the legislative history shows 
that the predecessor of § 1400(b) was broader than the contemporary general 
venue requirement, and hence provided patent owners more venue options 
than other federal civil plaintiffs. 78  In the past seventy years, Congress 
continuously liberalized the general venue requirement for non-patent 
plaintiffs and expressed its intent to synchronize the patent venue statute with 
the general venue statute by revising the statutory text of § 1391(c).79 But the 
Court continually held that Congress never changed the meaning of § 
1400(b) because, allegedly, (1) the statute was originally intended to be 
independent of § 1391(c), and (2) Congress never changed its mind. 80 
Because of this freeze on § 1400(b) by the Court, now patent plaintiffs have 
fewer venue options than their peers who were not restrained by the venue 
requirement under the current general venue statute. This section will argue 
that, although the § 1400(b)’s predecessor was intended to be independent, 
Congress has expressed its changing mind in its revision of the statute. 
A. The First Prong of § 1400(b), Fourco, and TC Heartland 
The Supreme Court addressed § 1400(b) and its predecessor three times 
in history. The first time, in Stonite, the Court concluded that § 1400(b)’s 
predecessor was independent of the predecessor of § 1391(c).81 This Article 
does not dispute this part of Stonite but disagrees with the following Fourco 
and TC Heartland cases, which held that the definition of “residence” in § 
1391(c), after being re-codified in 1948, still did not apply to § 1400(b).82 As 
explained below, the plain text of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) runs counter to 
Fourco and TC Heartland. What’s more, the Supreme Court 
miscomprehended the legislative intent underlying the 1948 re-codification, 
the 1988 amendment, and the 2011 amendment. 
A plain reading of § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) shows that the latter should 
control the former. It has been a consensus among courts that, to interpret a 
 
 78. See infra Part II, Section B. 
 79. See infra Part IV.  
 80. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1957); TC Heartland 
LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). 
 81. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942). 
 82. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 228–29; TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21. 
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statute, a court should look at its text first.83 Current § 1400(b) reads: “[a]ny 
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district 
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”84 Most of 
this sentence is clear except the terms (1) “resides” and (2) “regular and 
established place of business.” If we only look at the plain text of § 1391(c), 
it apparently supplements the definition of “residence”: 
 
For all venue purposes . . . (2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be 
sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not 
incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial 
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff, 
only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of 
business.85 
 
§ 1391(a) also delineates the applicability of this section: “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by law . . . this section shall govern the venue of all civil 
actions brought in district courts of the United States . . . .” 86 
Despite this textual clarity, the Fourco and TC Heartland Courts 
reached contrary conclusions based on its own precedents, its interpretation 
of legislative history, and short phrases like “except as otherwise provided 
by law.”87 The first time the Supreme Court addressed this question was in 
Stonite where the Court concluded that the predecessor of § 1400(b), as 
originally enacted, was independent of the predecessor of § 1391(c).88 After 
Congress re-codified the predecessors of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) to their 
current formats, Justice Whittaker, in Fourco, stated again for the court that 
the definition of “reside” in § 1391(c) did not apply to § 1400(b).89 Although 
Congress had explicitly stated that the re-codified statutes themselves were 
determinative and referenced to prior volumes of the statute at large became 
 
 83. Justice Elena Kagan, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Interview at 
Harvard Law School the Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes 
(Nov. 18, 2015) (“we are all textualists now.”), see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal scholarship highlight: 
Justice Scalia’s textualist legacy, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/ (“It is 
now generally agreed that when interpreting a statute, a court should start by reading the statutory text 
and should not lightly depart from the text.”). 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2011). 
 87. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 88. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942). 
 89. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1957). 
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wholly unnecessary,90 Justice Whittaker still cited to the prior Stonite case 
and claimed that the question was “whether there has been a substantive 
change in that statute since the Stonite case.”91 The potential substantive 
change happened in 1948 when Congress substituted the term “of which the 
defendant is an inhabitant” in § 1400(b)’s predecessor with the term “where 
the defendant resides“.92 At the same time, Congress similarly substituted 
the term “whereof he is an inhabitant” in § 1391(c)’s predecessor with the 
word “reside”.93 The re-codified § 1391(c) further defined “residence” for a 
corporate defendant as “any judicial district in which it is incorporated or 
licensed to do business or is doing business.”94 
Referring to a Reviser Note accompanying the § 1400(b) bill, the 
Fourco Court held that these two simultaneous changes of the term did not 
mean that Congress intended § 1391(c) to complement § 1400(b).95 The § 
1400(b) Note stated: “Words in subsection (b) ‘where the defendant resides’ 
were substituted for ‘of which the defendant is an inhabitant.’ Words 
‘inhabitant’ and ‘resident,’ as respects venue, are synonymous.”96 In other 
words, under the interpretation of Fourco, the substitution within § 1400(b) 
did not change the meaning of the statute: for patent venue purpose, 
“residence” of a corporation was still the judicial district where the defendant 
was incorporated.97 
However, whether the § 1400(b) Note indeed supported the Court’s 
conclusion was questionable in light of another Reviser Note regarding § 
1391(c). The § 1391(c) Note similarly stated the “Word ‘reside’ was 
substituted for ‘whereof he is an inhabitant’ for clarity inasmuch as 
‘“inhabitant’” and ‘“resident’” are synonymous.”98 If the Court’s conclusion 
in Fourco was correct, the meaning of § 1391(c) should also be the same 
before and after the 1948 recodification. Nevertheless, the recodification 
indisputably redefined the meaning of “reside” in § 1391(c). Therefore, the 
§ 1400(b) Note cannot preclude the possibility that the 1948 recodification 
changed the meaning of § 1400(b). The Note explained why Congress did 
 
 90. S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1 (1948). 
 91. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 225. 
 92. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) (2019)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A130-31 (1947). 
 93. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A127 (1947). 
 94. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A147 (1947). 
 95. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227–28. 
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A130-31. 
 97. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 226. 
 98. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A127. 
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not directly redefine the term “inhabitant” but instead changed the term 
“inhabitant” to “resident” and then defined “resident.” The Court’s reliance 
on this Reviser Note was misplaced. 
The Fourco court also mistakenly relied on a statement of a special 
consultant on this revision at the House hearing: “Venue provisions have not 
been altered by the revision.”99 According to the Court, this statement also 
supported the conclusion that the simultaneous linguistic substitution within 
§ 1400(b) and § 1391(c) did not change the meaning of § 1400(b). 100 
However, this quotation pointed only to § 1391(c). This revision 
unquestionably changed the definition of “residency” for corporate 
defendants in § 1391(c). In the past, corporations “inhabited” only in the 
districts where they were incorporated101. After the revision, corporations 
resided in any judicial districts where they were incorporated, were licensed 
to do business, and were doing business.102 This change of definition was 
actually “radical”, the special consultant concluding in his book published 
later.103 However, practically, the legal effect of the § 1391(c)’s predecessor 
and § 1391(c) for general civil litigations were the same before and after the 
revision. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., the Court held that 
corporations waived their venue objection when they designated an agent to 
accept service to obtain license to do business in a state.104 § 1391(c) codified 
Neirbo into the statute by redefining the term “reside/inhabit” to include 
judicial districts where defendants were licensed to do business. Although 
having the same legal effect, § 1391(c) was still different from § 1391(c)’s 
predecessor in two aspects. First, the waiver doctrine was a judicially created 
doctrine, but the new definition was a positive law. Second, waiving an 
objection was different from not having such an objection in the first place. 
In these two aspects, the revision indeed changed § 1391(c). The change in 
the definition of the term “residence” changed the effect of § 1400(b), even 
though it had no practical effect on § 1391(c) because of the Neirbo case. 
If Fourco itself was a mistake, it casts TC Heartland’s reliance on 
Fourco in great doubt. Even if Fourco was correct, TC Heartland’s analysis 
about changes made to § 1391(c) after Fourco was also wrong. Contrary to 
 
 99. Revising, Codifying, and Enacting into Law Title 28 of the United States Code, Entitled 
“Judicial Code and Judiciary”: Hearing on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055 Before the Subcomm. No. 1. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., at 29 (1947) (statement of James William Moore, Professor of 
Law, Yale University); Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227. 
 100. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227. 
 101. See Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1892). 
 102. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)). 
 103. JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 194 (1949). 
 104. 308 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1939). 
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the Court’s opinion, Congress had clearly expressed its intent to overturn 
Fourco in the 1988 revision of § 1391(c), and the alleged “saving clause” 
does not save Fourco. 
TC Heartland relied on an interpretation canon that Congress can only 
overturn the Court’s interpretation by clear expression in the revised 
provision. 105  The canon itself is valid, but the Court’s application was 
problematic. To correctly apply this canon, the Court should look at all 
changes made to § 1391(c) after Fourco. So long as Congress expressed its 
intent to overturn Fourco once, it does not need to repeat its intent every 
time. The Court refused to find such expression in the current 2011 version 
of § 1391(c) but forgot to examine the 1988 revision to § 1391(c). 106 
Congress added the phrase “for purposes of venue under this chapter” in the 
1988 revision of § 1391(c), and the phrase was a clear enough expression of 
intent to overturn Fourco.107 There were only a few venue provisions under 
the same chapter as § 1391(c), and § 1400(b) was one of them. By adding 
such a phrase, Congress must have considered whether § 1391(c) should 
control § 1400(b) and determined it was. If such a phrase is not a clear 
enough expression, what is? Congress should not have to explicitly name a 
wrongfully decided case in a revised provision of law. The fact that Congress 
changed such a phrase to “for all venue purposes” later in 2011 is immaterial. 
The saving clause “except as otherwise provided by law,” which was 
added in the 2011 revision, does not save Fourco.108 When Congress last 
amended § 1391(c) in 2011, observers all believed that VE Holding was the 
controlling law, which already held that § 1391(c) supplemented the 
definition of “residence” in § 1400(b).109 Therefore, when Congress added 
the saving clause, it did not have Fourco in mind. 
B. The Second Prong of § 1400(b), Stonite, and Cray 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit misunderstood the 
legislative purpose of § 1400(b) and its predecessor. Their purpose was 
originally to provide patent owners more venue options, even more than what 
other civil plaintiffs had. In Cray, the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme 
Court’s instruction in Stonite that the predecessor of § 1400(b) was “a 
 
 105. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4669 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)). 
 108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011). 
 109. Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping and Patent Law—A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 141, 152 (2017). 
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restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue [the 1789 statute]” and 
interpreted the second prong of § 1400(b) “restrictively.” 110  As a result, 
according to Judge Lourie, the phrase “regular and established place of 
business” textually requires that the defendant must have a physical presence 
in a judicial district to establish venue for patent infringement cases. 111 
However, Stonite itself mistakenly interpreted the legislative history of § 
1400(b), and the Cray interpretation was not as textualist as what the Federal 
Circuit claimed it to be. 
Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, the predecessor of § 1400(b) served 
the objective of enlarging another prior, narrower venue statute (the 1887 
statute), which most courts chose to apply to patent infringement cases over 
the “prior, broader venue” (the 1789 statute).112 As Representative Lacey 
explained at the Committee meeting, this statute provided an additional 
option for patent owners other than the existing law.113 This aspect of history 
has been ignored for a long time.114 The Supreme Court’s misunderstanding 
was rooted in the debate at the House. To persuade opponents of the bill, 
who did not want to give patent owners more venue options, Congressmen 
Mitchell raised the argument that the bill was more limiting than the 1789 
statute, which allegedly half of the lower courts applied.115 However, only a 
few lower courts applied the 1789 statute to patent infringement cases.116 
Most lower courts applied the 1887 statute to such cases, and the bill was 
less limiting than the 1887 statute.117 Further, this argument did not convince 
the opponent legislators, and hence it did not indicate the legislative intent.118 
The key dispute between the opponents, represented by Representative 
Sereno E. Payne of New York, and the proponents, represented by 
Representative John F. Lacey of Iowa and Representative John M. Mitchell 
of New York, was why Congress needed to enact a statute that was less 
limiting than the 1887 statute which governed general civil plaintiffs.119 
Representative Mitchell first argued that there was a lower court conflict 
about whether the 1789 statute or the 1887 statute should govern patent 
 
 110. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 111. Id. at 1362. 
 112. Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 556–58 
(1973) (pointing out and explaining briefly why the § 1400(b)’s legislators might have assumed that the 
1887 Act was controlling). 
 113. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–02 (1897). 
 114. Wydick, supra note 112, at 556–58. 
 115. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–01 (1897). 
 116. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
 117. See id.; infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 118. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.  
 119. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–02 (1897). 
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infringement cases in the late eighteenth centuries. 120  This uncertainty 
allegedly justified a specific patent venue statute: 
 
Conflicting decisions have even arisen in the different districts in the same 
States as to the construction of these acts of 1887 and 1888, and there is 
great uncertainty throughout the country as to whether or not the act of 
1887 as amended by the act of 1888 applied to patent cases at all.121 
 
However, certainty is only a partial justification for the bill as enacted. 
As Representative Payne aptly pointed out, Congress could solve this 
uncertainty by simply saying that the 1887 statute controlled in patent 
infringement cases.122 “In order to get rid of these conflicting decisions it 
would not be necessary to go further [less limiting] than that,” said 
Representative Payne.123 
In reaching its conclusion that the statute was intended to be a 
“restrictive measure,” the Stonite Court mistakenly relied on a second 
argument made by Representative Mitchell. However, the second argument 
did not persuade Congress either and hence did not embody the legislative 
purpose of Congress.124 Representative Mitchell argued that, although less 
limiting than the 1887 statute, the bill was more limiting than the 1789 
statute, which a lot of lower courts held controlling in patent infringement 
cases.125 Compared with the 1789 statute, the proposed statute was narrower 
because simply being able to be found in a district, which is sufficient to 
establish venue under the 1789 statute, was insufficient to establish venue 
under the proposed bill.126 Compared with the 1887 statute, on the other 
hand, the proposed patent-specific statute was broader for it additionally 
allowed patent owners to bring suit in the district where the defendant 
committed infringement and had a regular and established place of 
 
 120. See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (holding that the 1887 Act “is inapplicable to an 
alien or a foreign corporation sued here, and especially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right”); 
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1895) (interpreting Hohorst’s rationale as (1) it 
involved foreign defendant, and (2) jurisdiction to hear patent case was exclusive to federal courts, and 
the general venue statute controlled only those federal case with concurrent state jurisdiction). 
 121. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900 (1897). 
 122. Id. at 1901. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Compare Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c) (2011)) with Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) (2019)). 
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business. 127  However, Representative Payne was not convinced by the 
limiting argument either.128  
In fact, Representative Mitchell exaggerated the severity of the split. In 
the list proffered by Representative Mitchell to show how severe the split 
was, if we carefully examine it, we see that twelve decisions held that the 
1887 statute applied to patent infringement cases, and only four decisions 
held the 1789 statute controlling.129 Therefore, the bill provided more venue 
freedom to patent owners in most lower courts. In Stonite, the Court ignored 
these twelve cases holding that the 1887 statute applied to patent 
infringement cases and heavily relied on the limiting argument made by 
Representative Mitchell.130 The Court cited the only five cases holding the 
1789 statute applicable and opined: “[t]hereafter the lower federal courts, for 
the most part, took the position that the Act of 1887 as amended did not apply 
to suits for patent infringement and that infringers could be sued wherever 
they could be found.”131 As explained above, this misstated the fact. 
As Professor Wydick correctly concluded, the real legislative intent of 
§ 1400(b)’s predecessor was to provide patent owners with more forum 
options. Scholars believe that the argument which successfully persuades 
objectors indicates the actual “congressional intent.”132  In the case of § 
1400(b)’s predecessor, such argument took place when Representative 
Mitchell yielded to Representative Lacey who argued more 
straightforwardly why patent owners deserve more venue options: 
 
We have now a law by which, if an insurance company shall have agency 
and transact business in some other State, jurisdiction may be had in regard 
to business growing out of the transaction of that agency; and so as to 
carriers performing service in any State and having permanent place of 
business there, they may be sued there. There is no reason why as broad a 
jurisdiction should not be had in cases of patents, if infringer opens up a 
permanent place of business—commence their business at that place. Why 
not give the court the jurisdiction to try that case where the individual 
resides, where the witnesses are?. . .Because of this necessity arose we 
have this bill. Very frequently an infringing agency is the principal place 
of business. When the party defendant who nominally infringes the patent 
 
 127. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)) with Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)). 
 128. 29 CONG. REC. 1,901–02 (1897). 
 129. Id. at 1901. 
 130. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565–67 (1942).  
 131. Id. at 565 n.4. 
 132. “Last act” before major compromise, i.e. cloture, is a strong indication of Congressional intent. 
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 
YALE L.J. 70, 98–109, 118–28 (2012). 
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in one place, but the real place where the business is carried is at another, 
at present, the place of the defendant’s residence alone gives jurisdiction 
. . . [T]o deprive the court of [Northwest] of jurisdiction would work 
hardship by reason of the expense that would cause of having to take 
depositions or transport witnesses a thousand miles in the trial of a case. 
Why not have the trial where the transaction occurs? The jurisdiction 
under this bill only applies to the permanent place of business, or where 
the business is in existence.133 
 
In fact, Representative Lacey introduced the bill because several patent 
owners in the Northwest complained that they had to travel to where the 
defendant was incorporated to obtain relief. 134  Finally, this eloquent 
argument convinced Representative Payne, and Congress passed the bill.135 
Therefore, this Article concurs with Professor Wydick that the Supreme 
Court was wrong when it concluded in Stonite that the bill was to limit a 
prior, broader venue statute. As explained above, it was to provide patent 
owners with more venue options. As Senator Platt summarized at the Senate, 
“[a]ll there is about this bill is that it [additionally] authorizes suit to be 
brought against an infringer in the place where the business is carried on and 
service to be made upon an agent in the case of a corporation.” 136 
Accordingly, the interpreting approach adopted in Cray was also misplaced. 
If we, as the Federal Circuit taught in Cray, “be mindful of this history in 
applying the statute,” we should not interpret § 1400(b) as a “restrictive 
measure.” 
Although nowadays patent owners do not deserve more protection than 
non-patent plaintiffs, they do not deserve any less. In 1897, inventors in the 
Midwest area (then Northwestern area) gradually obtained a fair number of 
patents.137 Corporations incorporated in the East Coast manufactured their 
products in the Midwest, and some of them infringed those patents owned 
by Midwest inventors. 138  Because of the 1887 venue statute, Midwest 
inventors could not sue the Eastern infringers in Midwest cities. Instead, they 
had to travel to the Eastern states to ask for a relief.139 As a result, since 
transportation cost was high at that time, the cost of taking depositions and 
transporting witnesses was very burdensome for patent owners. 140  They 
 
 133. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897); Wydick, supra note 112, at 555 (understanding the debate as that 
Representative Lacey corrected Representative Mitchell’s mistake). 
 134. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 29 CONG. REC. 2,719 (1897). 
 137. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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wanted to change this inconvenient situation, so the § 1400(b)’s predecessor 
ensued. The statute had a solid rationale at the time of enactment. It provided 
patent owners more venue options than other non-patent plaintiffs because 
patent infringement could arise more remotely from defendants than other 
claims more commonly found in the nineteenth century, and it was unfair to 
let the plaintiff bear all the costs to travel. In the last century, more and more 
corporations expanded to a national scope. Interstate claims are not unique 
to patent infringement cases anymore. To alleviate plaintiffs’ economic 
burdens, as summarized below, Congress continuously liberalized the venue 
requirement for general plaintiffs. Congress did not simultaneously loosen 
the venue requirement for patent owners, at least not directly. And the Court, 
on the other hand, kept rejecting the arguments that Congress indirectly 
liberalized patent venue requirement. As a result, nowadays, patent owners 
have less venue options than non-patent plaintiffs. Since patent infringement 
claims are not unique anymore, patent owners do not deserve more venue 
freedom than they used to. However, they do not deserve any less than non-
patent plaintiffs. Therefore, even if we do not consider the original legislative 
intent underlying § 1400(b), interpreting it as a “restrictive measure” still 
does not make sense. 
What’s more, a textualist reading of the phrase “regular and established 
place of business” in the second prong of § 1400(b) does not dictate a 
“physical place” requirement. An area where a defendant conducts extensive 
business should be able to meet what the second prong textually required. In 
Cray, Judge Lourie held that the word “place” in the second prong of § 
1400(b) requires that the defendant must have a “physical place” in a judicial 
district.141 Though in The Century Dictionary the word “place” indeed has 
the meaning “[a] building or a part of a building set apart for any purpose” 
or “quarters of any kind,” it also has other meanings like “an area or portion 
of land marked off or regarded as marked off, or separated from the rest, as 
by occupancy, use, or character.”142 Similarly, in the Webster’s A Complete 
Dictionary of the English Language, the word “place” also has the meaning 
“any portion of space regarded as distinct from all other space, as related to 
any other portion, or as appropriate to some definitive object or use.”143 In 
Cray, Judge Lourie cited the language of Representative Lacey and opined 
that “[j]urisdiction would not be conferred by ‘[i]solated cases of 
 
 141. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 142. Id. (citing Place, WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, 732 (Benjamin E. 
Smith ed. 1911).  
 143. Place, NOAH WEBSTER, ’A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 544 
(Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter rev. ed. 1872). 
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infringement’ but ‘only where a permanent agency is established.’” 144 
However, the whole sentence was, “The jurisdiction under this bill only 
applies to the permanent place of business, or where the business is in 
existence.” 145  Therefore, in this sense, a “place of business” does not 
necessarily require a physical house or building. An area where a “business 
is in existence” should be sufficient to meet the second prong of § 1400(b). 
III. THE COURT SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING A MOVE AS 
DRASTIC AS TC HEARTLAND WHEN ALL VENUE REFORM BILLS FAILED AT 
CONGRESS 
Though legally contrary to both the text and the legislative history of § 
1400(b) and § 1391(c), TC Heartland and Cray aimed at a convincing policy 
objective: solving the forum shopping problem that happened at the Eastern 
District of Texas. 146  This policy objective is a theme mentioned in the 
Petitioner’s brief, and most amicus briefs supporting the Petitioner, in TC 
Heartland.147 During the oral argument, Justice Stephen Breyer remarked 
that he was surprised with all of the policy arguments unconnected to the 
case before the Court.148 Professor Anderson pointed out that the Court was 
acting as a “release valve” when Congress cannot reach an agreement, and 
the Federal Circuit does not solve a problem.149 
However, at the same time, the Court should be cautious about making 
a move as drastic as TC Heartland and Cray, especially when all venue 
reform bills failed at Congress. The Court institutionally lacks not only the 
authority to do so but also the capacity to conduct a comprehensive policy 
consideration. Even if the forum shopping problem became extraordinary, 
the Court should have narrowly tailored its holding to alleviate the problem 
for the sake of prudence. As explained below, the Court overstepped in TC 
Heartland and Cray. As Professor Chien testified at a congressional hearing 
after TC Heartland, if the pre-TC Heartland rules were plaintiff-friendly, the 
 
 144. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1361 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
 145. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897) (emphasis added). 
 146. J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in A “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of 
Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1613–14 (2018). 
 147. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 14, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341); Brief for National Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). 
 148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). 
 149. Anderson, supra note 146, at 1608–09. 
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post-Heartland rules could be considered defendant-friendly, with equity 
perhaps lying somewhere in between.150 
TC Heartland and Cray were so drastic that now the patent venue 
requirement is more restrictive than those bills that failed in Congress. For 
example, the first prong of the failed Patent Reform Act of 2006, 2007, and 
2009 and the Patents Depend on Quality Act would have allowed patent 
venue in at least the judicial districts where the defendant has a principal 
place of business or is incorporated, which is more lenient than only where 
the defendant is incorporated, as required by TC Heartland.151 The Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, 2007, and 2009 and the VENUE Act would have even 
provided patent owners with their home court when certain requirements are 
met. 152  Nevertheless, these bills were all rejected as “too limiting.” 
Obviously, Congress is not yet ready for embracing a venue reform as drastic 
as TC Heartland and Cray. 
IV. TIGHTENING THE PATENT VENUE REQUIREMENT IS AGAINST THE 
TREND OF LIBERALIZING VENUE REQUIREMENT 
TC Heartland and Cray re-impose an independent venue requirement 
on patent owners, which is contrary to a seventy-year-long legislative trend 
of liberalizing the venue requirement.  
The doctrine of venue was a common law doctrine that originated from 
England.153 Because jurors needed to judge cases based on their personal 
knowledge about the case, a venue near where the cause of action arose was 
necessary.154 Gradually, the role of jurors transitioned to adjudicator of cases 
based on facts presented.155 At the same time, the underlying policy goal of 
venue became providing a convenient forum to both the plaintiffs and 
 
 150. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 8–11 (2017) 
(statement of Colleen Chien, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law). 
 151. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Aug. 3, 
2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24, 2008); 
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009); Patents 
Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. §7 (2006). 
 152. Lamar Smith, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 § 9, at 56-57, 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/AmendedSmithBill.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2019); Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24, 2008); Patent Reform 
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009); Venue Equity and Non-
Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).  
 153. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1163–64 
(2014). 
 154. Id. at 1162–63. 
 155. Id. at 1163. 
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defendants.156 In the modern era, Congress is the institution determining 
which venue is convenient to parties of a litigation.157 It has revised the venue 
statutes several times in the past century since the statutes’ enactment, partly 
because modern corporations operate more widely.158 
In 1789, Congress enacted the first general venue statute under which 
venue was proper in any judicial district where the defendant inhabited or 
where the defendant “shall be found.”159 In 1887, Congress eliminated the 
federal question venue in districts where the defendant “shall be found.”160 
As the result, under the 1887 Judicial Act, venue was proper only in the 
judicial district where the defendant was incorporated.161 
Since then, Congress started a trend to liberalize the general venue 
requirement, and its direction never turned back. In 1948, Congress replaced 
the 1887 venue statute with § 1391(c), which substituted the word “whereof 
he is an inhabitant” with the word “where all defendants reside” and defined 
“residence” for a corporate defendant as “any judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business.” 162  The 
consensus was that the “‘doing business”‘ standard significantly expanded 
corporate venue. 163  However, the courts applied different standards in 
determining what constituted “doing business.”164 Some of them equated the 
standard with the “minimum contacts test” under International Shoe v. State 
of Washington, partly because the 14th Amendment had already injected the 
“convenience” element into the jurisdictional analysis, which originally was 
concerned about the limit of the court’s adjudication power.165 Some other 
courts rejected such approach and held that venue required more than 
satisfying the jurisdictional requirement.166 
Congress has also expressed its intent to synchronize the patent venue 
statute with the liberalized general venue statute. In 1988, Congress 
legislatively adopted the “jurisdictional test” approach and completely 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. E. Lawrence Vincent, Defining ‘Doing Business’ to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 153, 154 (1986). 
 158. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204 (1966). 
 159. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) 
(2011)). 
 160. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c) (2011)). 
 163. Vincent, supra note 157, at 160. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Markowitz & Nash, supra note 153, at 1205–07; Vincent, supra note 157, at 160–65. 
 166. Vincent, supra note 157, at 165–68. 
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collapsed the general venue statute into the personal jurisdiction 
requirement.167 Under the 1988 Amendment, § 1391(c) defined corporate 
“residence” as “any judicial district in which the corporate defendant would 
be subject to personal jurisdiction, under the minimum contacts test, if that 
district were a separate state unto itself.”168 According to the text of this 
statute, this definition held for venue purposes under the same chapter of the 
United States Code. The last amendment to § 1391(c) happened in 2011.169 
Then, Congress expanded the application of this definition of “residence” to 
“venue of all civil actions” “except as otherwise provided by law.”170 This 
held for “all venue purposes,” instead of only venue under Chapter 28.171 As 
explained above, patent owners do not deserve any less protection than other 
civil plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court should be cautious when it continuously 
limits patent owners’ venue options. 
V. EQUALIZING COURTS, INSTEAD OF RESHUFFLING DOCKETS: VENUE IS 
NOT THE CURE 
“The easiest way to reduce forum shopping would be to unwind the 
conditions that enable it: a multitude of potential forums from which litigants 
may choose and the ability of district courts to differentiate themselves from 
one another in terms of potential benefits they can offer,” as stated by 
Professor Chien and Associate Dean Risch.172 
Although venue reform can eliminate the Eastern District of Texas 
problem quicker,173 it is a painkiller with many side effects. If the venue 
reform is going to be narrowly tailored to the Eastern District of Texas, one 
of the other district courts left open will be the next destination for patent 
owners.174 Courts competing with each other to attract patent dockets, by 
providing procedural benefits to patent owners, is a phenomenon which has 
repeated many times in our history.175 Ultimately, plaintiffs will still forum 
 
 167. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 168. Thomas W. Adams, The 1988 Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): Corporate Venue Is Now 
Equivalent to In Personam Jurisdiction Effects on Civil Actions for Patent Infringement, 39 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 357, 363 (1991). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1027, 1058 (2017) (quoting Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 
77 MD. L. REV. 46 (2017) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6)). 
 173. Id. at 1058–59. 
 174. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 659–67 (2015). 
 175. Id. at 636. 
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shop for the most plaintiff-friendly district court.176 If the venue reform is 
going to be sweeping, it will also have many side effects. For example, after 
TC Heartland, the District of Delaware has become the district court with 
most patent infringement filings.177 The District of Delaware is unlikely to 
become a pro-plaintiff venue because Delaware certainly does not want to 
deter companies away from being incorporated in the State, and the District 
of Delaware, though a federal court, will be influenced by the communities’ 
attitude, just like the Eastern District of Texas.178 For the same reason, it is 
very possible that the District of Delaware is going to be a very pro-
defendant venue, which designs procedures unfair to patent owners. This 
will be contrary to the venue requirement’s goal: achieving a balance 
between plaintiffs’’ and defendant’s’ interests. It is never a one-sided 
consideration. 
 These side effects are because of one reason: the underlying 
consideration of the venue statutes is a convenience to plaintiff and 
defendant, not eliminating forum shopping.179 As the Court once remarked: 
“the venue provisions are designed, not to keep suits out of the federal courts, 
but merely to allocate suits to the most appropriate . . . forum.”180 Therefore, 
although a statute can restrict venue freedom of plaintiffs and thereby 
alleviate the forum shopping problem, it cannot eliminate the problem 
completely. At the same time, a venue reform wanting to alleviate forum 
shopping by excluding certain federal courts will inevitably sacrifice the 
fairness of venue to either plaintiff or defendant, the core purpose of it. 
The availability of multiple forums for plaintiffs does not cause forum 
shopping, differences in those forums do. 181  The real cause of forum 
shopping is the differences in patent trial procedure amongst district 
courts.182  Patent local rules and judges standing orders make the forum 
shopping problem more severe in the patent world than in other fields of law. 
Professor Gollwitzer aptly summarized in his article the difference among 
 
 176. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999). 
 177. Byrd, supra note 68.  
 178. Anderson, supra note 146, at 1611–12. 
 179. Vincent, supra note 157, at 154. 
 180. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 (1972). 
 181. Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of A Salesman? Forum Shopping and 
Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 775–76 (1995). 
 182. See, e.g., Adam S. Baldridge, Venue Considerations for Patent Infringement Cases, ASPATORE, 
2013 WL 574397, at *1 (Jan. 2013) (“[W]hether a district court has adopted patent local rules is a 
significant consideration for a patent holder in determining the best venue in which to file a patent 
infringement action.”). 
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patent local rules and standing orders adopted by district court judges,183 and 
Professor La Belle further explained in her article how the procedural 
difference endangers the uniformity of both procedural and substantive 
patent law.184 In other areas of law, differences in substantive law and juror 
population are the two most common incentives for forum shopping. 
Compared to other areas of law, substantive patent law is more unified due 
to the single Court of Appeal—the Federal Circuit. Therefore, the fact that 
forum shopping problem is much more serious in the patent world is counter-
intuitive. Only local patent rules adopted by district courts can account for 
such a phenomenon. As explained below, because different courts’ local 
patent rules differ substantially, the benefit of forum shopping is much more 
significant in patent litigation. For example, most plaintiffs choose the 
Eastern District of Texas for its local procedure, which makes it easy for 
plaintiffs to get a settlement. Professor Love and Professor Yoon 
summarized existing explanations for why plaintiffs like filing their cases in 
this district, including the judges’ relative quick pace at this venue, the pro-
plaintiff judges and jurors, and local patent rules advantages for patent 
owners. 185  After examining litigation data, they concluded that “the 
patentees suing in East Texas benefit from the district’s combination of early, 
broad discovery deadlines with late action on motions to transfer, motions 
for summary judgment, and claim construction.”186 Because attorney’s fees 
accrue at an earlier stage in the Eastern District of Texas than in other district 
courts, defendants have more incentive to settle the case.187 In other words, 
a liberal venue statute only contributes to the forum shopping problem for 
not prohibiting it. If patentees cannot enjoy procedural advantage from 
picking certain district courts, there is no need to impose on the venue statute 
the burdensome goal of keeping suits out from certain courts, 188 which will 
obstruct its original purpose.  
Congress purposefully facilitated the adoption of these different local 
patent rules via the Civil Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”), which granted 
district courts’ power to adopt their own local patent rules and standing 
orders.189 The starting point of the proliferation of local patent rules was 
 
 183. Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local Patent Rules—Certainty and Efficiency or a Crazy Quilt of 
Substantive Law?, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 94 (2012). 
 184. Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 95–109 (2015). 
 185. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the 
Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13–23 (2017). 
 186. Id. at 34. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Cameron & Johnson, supra note 181, at 775–
76. 
 189. La Belle, supra note 184, at 80.  
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around 1990 when Congress enacted CJRA which encouraged 
experimentation of local rules at the district court level.190 Before CJRA, 
although there were also numerous local rules authorized by Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 11, 16, 26, 83, the public criticized them for harming 
uniformity which the FRCP tried to achieve and were disfavored by 
Congress.191 The CJRA signified Congress’ changed attitude towards local 
rules because reducing costs and eliminating delay in civil litigation became 
Congress’ priority.192 
Now, almost all district courts have adopted their own versions of local 
patent rules and standing orders. As a result of CJRA, the Northern District 
of California became the first district court with its own local patent rules in 
2000.193 The rules include claim construction procedure, infringement, and 
validity contention requirements, mandatory disclosure requirements, and 
discovery and other procedural matters.194 Since then, thirty-two percent of 
all federal district court have adopted their own local patent rules.195 Besides 
these officially adopted local patent rules, individual judges also adopted 
their own standing orders to streamline their procedures for patent cases.196 
For example, in the District of Delaware, which does not have officially 
adopted local patent rules, four judges have their own versions of standing 
orders.197 In the Northern District of California, although it has officially 
adopted its local patent rules, six of the twenty-three judges have their own 
individualized standing orders.198 
These local patent rules and standing orders are in great variance. Some 
of them mandate different pleading standards; some of them give longer or 
more extensive discovery; some of them require earlier deadlines for 
infringement and validity contentions; some of them restrict the number of 
terms subjected to claim construction; some of them require parties to stick 
to their infringement and defensive theories; some of them demand earlier 
disclosure of damage models; some of them schedule trial earlier than others; 
and some have unique jury instructions.199 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 79. 
 192. Id. at 80. 
 193. Id. at 81–82. 
 194. Id. at 87. 
 195. Antonio DiNizo, Krafting TC Heartland: A Legislative Response to Venue Shopping, 100 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 24, 43 (2018). 
 196. La Belle, supra note 184, at 89. 
 197. Id. at 89–90. 
 198. Id. at 91. 
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These variances have a strong influence on parties’ litigation strategy. 
For example, in the Eastern District of Texas, its local rules require earlier 
disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions.200 Plaintiffs have an 
abundance of time to collect the necessary information, but defendants only 
have limited time to search for prior art references. Judge Davis of the 
Eastern District of Texas has described this potential effect of patent local 
rules on litigants’ strategies: 
 
While the Court will not comment on Plaintiff’s strategy, when combined 
with the requirements of the Patent Rules and the Court’s standard docket 
control order, Plaintiff’s strategy presents Defendants with a Hobson’s 
choice: spend more than the settlement range on discovery, or settle for 
what amounts to cost of defense, regardless of whether a Defendant 
believes it has a legitimate defense.201 
 
Thus, plaintiffs looking for quick settlements may be enticed to file their 
patent suits in districts that allow significant discovery early in the case. 
Contrary to the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of California 
is a court with pro-defendant local patent rules. It requires patent owners to 
“compare an accused product to its patents on a claim by claim, element by 
element basis for at least one of each defendant’s products.”202 “To make 
such a comparison, [a plaintiff must put forth information so specific that] 
‘either reverse engineering or its equivalent is required.’” 203  Non-
compliance of these rules will result in limited infringement theories.204 This 
explains why defendants always try to transfer their cases to the Northern 
District of California. Although VE Holding was criticized forcefully, only 
on rare occasions, have these patent local rules been challenged.205 In those 
occasions, the Federal Circuit has consistently upheld them as a proper 
exercise of the trial court’s case-management discretion under CJRA, partly 
because of some advantages provided by patent local rules.206 
Local patent rules have many advantages over not having any patent 
procedure rules, but a uniform Federal Rule of Patent Procedure is better in 
all aspects and can avoid many unintended effects including forum shopping. 
 
 200. Id. at 100. 
 201. Parallel Networks LLC v. AEO, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-00111-LED, slip op. at 6–7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 
15, 2011). 
 202. See Renesas Tech. Corp. v. Nanya Tech. Corp., No. C03-05709JFHRL, 2004 WL 2600466, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2004). 
 203. Id. 
 204. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 205. La Belle, supra note 184, at 78–79. 
 206. Id.  
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Professor Nguyen argued that local patent rules are top-down efforts to curb 
patent abuse and streamline patent cases, providing a more efficient 
procedure and predictable timetable for litigants.207 Judge Radar also stated 
that a set of announced and dependable procedural rules that all parties 
understand in advance, is beneficial.208 However, firstly, it is questionable 
whether local patent rules successfully curb patent abuse especially in the 
Eastern District of Texas. Secondly, a set of well-enacted uniform patent 
procedures can also achieve the alleged efficiency and predictability. 
Predictability can be achieved so long as there is a set of announced patent 
procedures, and efficiency can be better achieved by analyzing statistic data. 
We should keep in mind that CJRA granted district courts the authority to 
adopt their own local rules for a reason, which is to experiment different 
rules and collect data for enacting a better set of uniform rules. Since 2000, 
nineteen years have elapsed. Congress and the Judicial system have obtained 
enough data to enact a more efficient uniform patent trial procedure, which 
can bring patent litigation back to its ideal uniformity and get to the root of 
forum shopping.209 
Enacting Federal Rules of Patent Procedure will be a large project, but 
not an unprecedented one. Congress and the Court have promulgated district 
court procedural rules with similar scope in other areas of law. For example, 
Bankruptcy courts have their own trial procedures different from the 
standard Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in pleading standards, motion 
procedures, and other requirements.210 This Article leaves the question open 
about what the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure should look like, as this is 
a complicated question and there is a lack of academic literature concerning 
this subject. However, the baseline is, as Professor La Belle suggested, that 
legislatures should survey opinions from judges, practitioners, litigants, law 
professors, industry representatives, and economists when enacting such 
rules.211  Also, the enactment should take into account unique aspects of 
patent law, like claim construction and complicated technologies. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although many commentators applauded the Supreme Court’s decision 
in TC Heartland and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray for addressing 
the forum shopping problem, these decisions are contrary to both the text 
and the legislative history of the general venue statute § 1391(c) and the 
patent venue statute § 1400(b). Further, the Court should be cautious about 
making such drastic moves, especially when more lenient venue reform bills 
failed in Congress and when Congress has continuously liberalized venue 
requirement for general civil plaintiffs. 
Compared to venue reform, enacting a new Federal Rules of Patent 
Procedure is a more direct solution for the forum shopping problem. Venue 
statutes concern the convenience and fairness to plaintiffs and defendants 
and hence are never a good tool to fix the real problem: local rules unfair to 
plaintiffs. Now is the time to harvest the fruit from the “local rules 
experimentation” and promulgate Federal Rules of Patent Procedure. 
 
